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ABSTRACT
The American criminal justice system guarantees each 
citizen the right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury. 
Because juror biases might impede the realization of this 
guarantee, the law provides a protection for the defendant 
—  the presumption of innocence. Twelve mock juries viewed 
videotaped trials from jury boxes in a law school's Moot 
Court Room, and deliberated as actual juries. Results 
indicated that with the full trial setting, presumptions of 
innocence were not influenced by a manipulated biasing 
factor, congruence of the crime to the occupation of the 
defendant. Although it is unclear whether or not subjects 
presumed innocence at the beginning, their judgments at 
trial's end reflected a clear adherence to the law. 
Consistent effects emerged for subject sex, with females 
giving higher ratings of guilt than males, but showing less 
confidence in their judgments. Incongruent crimes were 
attributed to atypical behavior, while congruent crimes were 
ascribed to enduring character flaws. The lack of juror 
biases in this research at the end of the trial has 
implications for jury research where less realistic settings 
and less authentic material are employed.
v
PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: BIAS AS A FUNCTION
OF GENDER AND CRIME CONGRUENCE
2INTRODUCTION
The Sixth Amendment guarantees each citizen a fair 
trial by an impartial jury. This positive and reasonable 
principle is seldom realized in practice. Attorneys, 
themselves, are the first to admit that their goal is not to 
impanel an impartial jury (Fahringer, 1980; Krueger, 1981; 
Thorne, 1978), but to obtain jurors most favorable to their 
side. Yet jurors readily contend when questioned during 
voir dire that they can be fair and impartial. One attorney 
summed up this irony well, "We lie to them and they in turn 
lie to us" (Fahringer, 1980; p. 34).
If voir dire cannot be relied upon to ensure a set of 
unbiased jurors, what protection remains for the defendant? 
The law still claims the existence of an impartial jury, 
through application of a principle intended to counteract 
the effect of juror bias, the presumption of innocence. The 
defendant is presumed to be innocent at the start of the 
trial , with this presumption only overcome by guilt proven 
"beyond a reasonable doubt." The presumption of innocence 
stems from the belief that it is better to set ten guilty 
persons free rather than convict one innocent person 
(Blackstone, 1962). Although the presumption of innocence 
is not a part of Constitutional doctrine, its fundamental 
importance in the law has been recognized at least since it 
was noted in Coffin v. United States (1895): "The principle
that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the
3accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and 
its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration 
of our criminal law" (p. 453). Recognition that there will 
be error in the judicial process of reconstructing past 
events has instituted the criterion of proof "beyond a 
reasonable doubt," and the Model Penal Code (American Law 
Institute, 1962) designated the presumption of innocence as 
a supplement to this criterion. Yet, the distinction 
between the presumption of innocence and reasonable doubt is 
an important one (Coffin v. United States , 1895). The
presumption of innocence is an instrument of proof, a piece 
of evidence given in favor of the defendant, such that he or 
she is acquitted unless proved guilty. Reasonable doubt, 
however, refers to a condition of the mind and occurs as a 
result of all of the evidence. Interestingly, since 1920 
the instruction that guilt must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt has been mandatory, while the presumption 
of innocence instruction has not. Furthermore, omission of 
the presumption of innocence instruction is not recognized 
as a procedural error unless it is shown that the 
defendant's right to due process has been violated 
(Abramovsky, 1981; Orfield, 1963; Ranney, 1980). Recently, 
in Kentucky v. Whorton (1979), the court ruled that failure 
to give the presumption of innocence instruction does not 
always violate a defendant's rights and may only result in 
"harmless error."
There is, however, a more subtle violation of the
4defendant's rights —  the bias in social perception that 
pervades juries, if not effectively counteracted. Such bias 
might operate in jurors in three ways, according to Goldberg 
(1981): (a) in an attempt to achieve social equity —  a
sense of justice that rises above the law, (b) through 
individual differences or personal biases, and (c) in a 
presumption of guilt. The last of these is the focus of the 
proposed research. In some instances the actions of the law 
can contribute to a presumption of guilt. According to 
Abramovsky's (1981) discussion of the case of United States 
v. Barnes (1980), the court instilled a presumption of guilt 
in the minds of jurors. The judge sharply restricted the 
defense attorney's inquisition during voir dire, to ensure 
the safety of the jurors and their families. What other 
conclusion were the jurors to draw except that the 
defendants were so dangerous that their own anonymity had to 
be preserved? Confusion over the presumption of innocence 
is not confined to the courts, however. In 1979 the 
National Jury Project (Fahringer, 1980) reported that 25% of 
those selected for jury duty believe the defendant is guilty 
at the start of the trial and that 35% believe the defendant 
is responsible for proving his own innocence. Previous 
research by the present investigator has corroborated these 
results, showing that defendants are judged to be more 
responsible for proving their innocence than is required by 
the law, and that at least one issue —  "fit" between 
offender and crime —  can alter subjects' presumptions of
5innocence, even after specific judicial instructions have 
mentioned the relevant law (Helgeson & Shaver, 1983).
What extra-legal variables might contribute to such 
bias at the start of the trial? One possibility noted early 
in the social psychological literature on the problem was 
that attractive defendants might be given a decreased 
estimate of guilt compared to unattractive defendants 
(Efran, 1974; Landy & Aronson, 1969), although in one study 
this appeared only if the crime was unrelated to the 
attractiveness of the defendant (Sigall & Ostrove, 1975). 
Specifically, the latter study found that attractive 
defendants charged with attractiveness-related crimes were 
judged more severely than unattractive defendants charged 
with the same crimes. Later, Weiten (1980) found that 
attractiveness only had an effect on juridic judgment in the 
absence of instructions. A second possibility is that 
similarity of the juror to the defendant will be positively 
related to the perceived innocence, thereby reducing the 
impact of evidence (Griffitt & Jackson, 1973). Perceived 
similarity has been found to decrease judgments of guilt by 
authoritarian, but not egalitarian jurors (Mitchell & Byrne,
1973). Finally, the large-scale investigation of 
disagreements between judges and juries by Kalven and Zeisel 
(1966) revealed jury sentiments to be a contributing factor 
to one-third of the disagreements. But sentiment was rarely 
in and of itself the sole reason for the disagreements. It 
seems that juries resort to sentiment when the case is more
6uncertain or ambiguous (Baumeister & Darley, 1982; Ellison & 
Buckhout, 1981; Kaplan & Miller, 1978). This is little
consolation, however, because cases that go to juries are by 
nature uncertain. If they were not, some other legal 
procedure (e.g. plea bargaining) would have been employed.
Nearly all the social psychological research has 
examined variables that may bias jurors by the introduction 
of a critical variable embedded in a minimal amount of 
context, followed by a judgment of guilt or assignment of 
verdict —  tasks normally performed at the end of the trial . 
This kind of research operates under the assumption that 
those single judgments of guilt are comparable to the ones 
jurors make after viewing a complete trial and given full 
deliberation. Given the wide array of intervening variables 
that may occur between the initial introduction of the 
defendant and jury deliberation, a more fruitful approach 
might be to investigate how biases affect this initial 
assessment of the defendant, specifically with regard to the 
presumption of innocence, and then to determine exactly what 
effects persist through the trial to the final verdict.
Only three studies have investigated the presumption of 
innocence at the beginning of a trial. Two of these 
employed an information integration analysis (Anderson,
1974) to quantify presumption of innocence (Ostrom, Werner,
& Saks, 1978; Saks, Werner, & Ostrom, 1975). In these 
studies, subjects were given varying amounts of evidence, 
with every element previously scaled to suggest a low
probability of guilt or a high probability of guilt. 
Subjects' initial dispositions regarding probability of 
guilt were then estimated from their final judgments of 
guilt. Both studies concluded that subjects did have an 
initial probability of guilt near zero, supporting a 
presumption of innocence.
This approach, however, begins with the final outcome 
and extrapolates backwards, eliminating contributing factors 
and their weights, to estimate the initial impression. The 
justification for using these estimates is Saks et al.'s 
(1975) contention that the social desirability constraints 
of directly measuring people's initial probability of guilt 
would eliminate any condition differences. But this 
argument can be countered by the Kalven and Zeisel (1966) 
data noted above. Furthermore, the third piece of research 
by Helgeson and Shaver (1983) shows the ease with which 
presumptions of innocence can be manipulated. These 
investigators conducted two studies in which subjects were 
told that a defendant was charged with a crime congruent or 
incongruent with his occupation and then asked to estimate 
that defendant's probability of guilt at the start of the 
trial. Even when given judicial instructions that stated 
the defendant is presumed to be innocent at the start of the 
trial, subjects gave significantly greater initial judgments 
of guilt to defendants charged with congruent crimes than 
incongruent crimes.
Although there is strong evidence that extra-legal
8variables affect aspects of juridic judgment, the issue of 
when these effects occur and if they persist beyond 
deliberation is by no means settled. For example, Wasserman 
and Robinson (1980) have asked whether or not the results 
that emerge cannot be attributed to the nature of the 
design. Most of the research draws out and accentuates the 
specific social forces that are of social psychological 
interest. The inadequacy of the information provided in the 
scripts typically employed in simulation research 
constitutes a major threat to its external validity (Hastie, 
Penrod, & Pennington, 1983; Weiten & Diamond, 1979). The 
question that remains is not whether or not biasing factors 
can influence selected dependent variables, but whether they 
will continue to do so in the more perceptually rich 
environment provided by a full criminal trial, particularly 
when it includes judicial instructions. And here the 
previous research suggests that instructions may reduce bias 
(Reed, 1980; Weiten, 1980). When a judge's verbal
instructions were supplemented by a set of written
instructions, bias was further reduced (Asken, 1975). 
Similarly, in Helgeson and Shaver's (1983) previous work, 
when subjects were given written and oral instructions, oral 
instructions only, or no instructions, they adhered more 
strongly to the presumption of innocence when written 
instructions were included compared to the latter two groups
on many of the dependent measures. On one crucial dependent
variable, however, the estimated probability of guilt at the
9start of the trial, there was no effect for any of the 
instructions.
Perhaps the most attention has been given to the 
specific timing of the judicial instruction. Although the 
presence of a pretrial instruction has consistently been 
shown to be more effective in reducing bias than the 
predeliberation instructions alone (Goldberg, 1981; Kassin & 
Wrightsman, 1979), in most cases the law utilizes the 
predeliberation instructions without any initial pretrial 
instruction. The delivery of the instructions after the 
evidence, but before jury deliberation, not only assumes a 
perfect recall, but also assumes that no real decisions have 
as yet been made. According to Kaplan and Miller (1978), 
initial bias may acquire more impact if the judicial 
instruction is not introduced immediately. The purpose of 
the instructions is to highlight the situational factors 
involved (Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Saks, 1976). Pretrial 
instructions reduced the number of convictions in Kassin & 
Wrightman's study (1979), while no differences were obtained 
between subjects given predeliberation instructions and no 
instructions. These researchers concluded that subjects 
given a pretrial instruction presumed innocence while 
subjects in the other two conditions presumed guilt.
Although the contention remains that giving the presumption 
of innocence instruction before deliberation increases its 
salience, at least one . judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that jurors tune
10
out by the end of the trial (Prettyman, 1960).
The present research investigated the effect of a 
prevalent variable, congruence —  operationalized as the 
perceptual fit between the crime and the defendant's 
occupation (Helgeson & Shaver, 1983) —  on the presumption 
of innocence in a courtroom setting. The presumption of 
innocence instruction was included as a pretrial and 
predeliberation instruction, in view of the theoretical and 
empirical research supporting instructions. To enhance the 
external validity of the research, written instructions were 
not included. A previous presentation of defendants charged 
with congruent and incongruent crimes, consisting of only a 
brief description of the defendant and the charge, has 
revealed a decreased presumption of innocence when the 
defendant was charged with a crime congruent to his 
occupation compared to a crime incongruent to his occupation 
(Helgeson & Shaver, 1983). In the present research a 
defendant who was not assigned an occupation was included in 
both the congruent and incongruent crime conditions to 
insure that condition differences were attributable to the 
conceptual variable of congruence and not the crimes 
themselves. While previous research has produced mixed 
evidence for a positive relationship between the seriousness 
of the consequences of a crime and judgments of 
responsibility (Chaikin & Darley, 1973; Samuel & Kraus,
1980; Shaver, 1970; Walster, 1966), a neglected task 
undertaken in the present research was to vary the severity
11
of the crime in terms of magnitude of the offense in 
examining the presumption of innocence. The present study 
utilized a courtroom and entire court cases not only to 
extend the verisimilitude of the research, but also to 
reveal the impact of the pre sumption of innocence on juror 
bias at different stages of the trial.
With the expectation that the extra-legal variable, the 
congruence of the crime to the occupation of the defendant, 
will bias jurors, the issues addressed were: at what
stage(s) will this bias surface if it does arise, and what 
will be the ultimate effect of this bias —  measured in the 
form of jury verdicts. Neither of these issues has been 
adequately examined and many studies extracting effects of 
bias during the initial phases of the trial assume that 
these effects will persist beyond deliberation. Thus, the 
dependent measures were evaluated in the form of 
probabilities of guilt and verdicts at four different phases 
throughout the trial: (a) at the start of the trial after
the initial instructions and introduction of the defendant, 
(b) after the prosecution's presentation of evidence and 
before defendant testimony, (c) at the end of the trial 
after the attorney's closing statements and judge's charge 
to the jury, and (d) after jury deliberation. The 
nonreactivity of multiple measures of juridic judgement has 
previously been confirmed (Kassin & Wrightsman, 1979).
The application of the social psychological literature 
on group processes to juries has favored an effect similar
12
to group polarization after deliberation (Bray & Noble,
1978; Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Wasserman & Robinson, 1980). 
Although group polarization is actually defined in terms of 
a shift in the extremity of judgment for each member of the 
group, in jury research this polarization refers to group's 
enhancement of the group's initial disposition. This 
phenomenon was statistically supported by Kalven and 
Zeisel's (1966) record that 90% of the jurors' verdicts were 
the same as the first ballot majority. Weaknesses in this 
report, however, stem from the questionable reliability of 
self-reports of previous decisions and, as Weiten and 
Diamond (1979) note, the opportunity for discussion before 
the first ballot was taken. Although the initial 
disposition may be a combination of bias and evidence, those 
who support the presumption of innocence contend that the 
deliberation of the group augments the impact of evidence 
and reduces bias. In one of the experiments conducted by 
Kaplan and Miller (1978), bias was manipulated by either the 
defense or prosecuting attorney's behaving in an annoying 
manner. As expected, predeliberation subjects gave the 
defendant the highest rating of guilt when the defense 
attorney was the source of the annoyance and gave the lowest 
rating of guilt when the prosecuting attorney was the source 
of the annoyance. After deliberation these effects 
disappeared, so that there were no differences between the 
two conditions. When attractiveness of the defendant was 
introduced by Izzett and Leginski (1974) to bias subjects,
13
the unattractive defendant was judged significantly more 
harshly than the attractive defendant prior to group 
discussion. Postdiscussion judgments revealed an overall 
decrease in the guilt of the defendants, which was mainly 
attributable to the reduced guilt of the unattractive 
defendant. These results support the above proposition only 
to the extent that subjects were biased against the 
unattractive defendant, rather than biased in favor of the 
attractive defendant. Ultimately, however, the 
postdiscussion ratings of guilt did not find the effect for 
attractiveness of the defendant obtained on the 
prediscussion measures. Thus, in the present research it 
was necessary to investigate the effect of group 
deliberation on jurors' biases and ultimately on their 
presumptions of innocence.
A 3 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 4  factorial design was employed to 
examine the effects of the occupation of the defendant 
(lawyer —  politician —  no occupation), the crime (bribery 
—  auto theft), subject sex (female —  male), magnitude of 
the offense ($400, $5000 bribe —  Buick, Ferrari theft), and 
time of measurement (four assessments) on the presumption of 
innocence throughout the trial. On the basis of previous 
research examining the influence of extra— legal variables 
(Helgeson & Shaver, 1983), interactions were expected to 
occur between the crime and the occupation of the defendant, 
such that higher ratings of guilt would be given to those 
defendants who held an occupation and were charged with the
14
congruent crime of bribery compared to the incongruent crime 
of auto theft. No differences would occur between the two 
crimes for the defendants who were not assigned an 
occupation. If, however, the criticisms of previous 
research for not employing full criminal trials equipped 
with judicial instructions and jury deliberation are valid, 
the effects of the extra-legal variable, congruence, should 
diminish throughout the trial with no ultimate effect on 
jury verdicts. It is not certain whether congruence effects 
would occur at all if the latter possibility holds true. 
Dependent measures were derived from the General 
Instructions for the presumption of innocence set by the 
Code of Virginia. Subjects were asked to give verdicts at 
each time of assessment so that the differences in 
probabilities of guilt necessary to change the more relevant 
dichotomous decision of guilt could be determined. Previous 
research has warned against the reliance upon probability 
estimates alone, because even statistically significant 
changes in estimates of guilt may not be sufficient to 
change a verdict (Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Weiten & Diamond, 
1979; Werner, Kagehiro, & Strube, 1982). Confidence
judgments were also included for some of the dependent 
measures so that the meaning of the judgments made during 
the trial could be more fully understood. In addition, 
possible attributions for criminal behavior were made by 
subjects. It was expected that the attributions for a crime 
congruent to the defendant's occupation would reflect a flaw
15
in character, while the attributions for a crime incongruent 
to the defendant's occupation would be due to situational 
circumstances and the defendant acting in a manner different 
from normal behavior.
Me thod
Subject s
Subjects were 82 male and 87 female undergraduate 
introductory psychology students at the College of William 
and Mary. They were run in 12 groups ranging in size from 
12 to 15, composed of, approximately half males and half 
females. Sessions were run over a ten day period. Each 
subject received credit toward a class research requirement 
for participation.
Design
Data were analyzed by a 3 (lawyer— politician— no 
occupation) by 2 (bribery— auto theft) by 2 (female— male) 
by 2 (small magnitude— large magnitude) factorial design.
In addition, dependent measures were taken at four different 
times during the experimental session. A repeated measures 
analysis was conducted on several of the dependent variables 
that were either measured at all four times of assessment or 
only the first and last time. Chi-squared analyses were 
performed for jury verdicts across trials and within trials, 
and estimated probabilities of guilt were correlated with 
their respective verdicts.
Materials
Stimulus booklets. Subjects were provided with
16
booklets, divided into four sections, one to be completed 
after each portion of the trial. The first set of questions 
contained the five dependent measures comprising the 
presumption of innocence, directly derived from the actual 
judicial instructions. These instructions are found in 
Appendix 1, while the dependent measures are in Appendix 2. 
Subjects were asked to rate their confidence for several of 
these measures. In addition, three attributional questions 
were included for the defendant's possible behavior. Two 
direct measures of impartiality were given, one less 
obviously affected by social desirability constraints than 
the other. Subjects were asked at this point in the trial 
what they thought their verdict would be at the end of the 
trial. To distinguish differences in frequency of the two 
crimes from differences in congruence, one question asked 
for the base rate of persons in the population who commit 
the specific crime and one question asked for the base rate 
of persons in the population with the same occupation as the 
defendant who commit that same crime (the latter asked only 
in those cases in which the defendant was assigned an 
occupation).
Parts 2 and 3 of the booklet were identical across 
conditions. Subjects were asked to assess the probability 
of the defendant's guilt and then choose an anticipated 
verdict. Confidence measures on both of these questions 
were also included.
Part 4 of the booklet contained the same presumption of
17
innocence measures and attributional questions as Part 1.
In addition, the manipulation checks for congruence and 
magnitude of the offense were included. Subjects were also 
asked to rate the importance of revealing the defendant's 
occupation, and to rate the seriousness of the offense.
Four bipolar dimensions for the defendant's characteristics 
(honesty, trustworthiness, sincerity, and goodness) also 
appeared at the end of the questionnaires.
Stimulus Trial Cases. Four of the university's law
school's fall bench trials provided the criminal trial
settings for the experiment. Two cases each were 
constructed for two crimes, bribery and auto theft, such 
that the guilt or innocence of the defendant would be 
ambiguous. Thus, doubt was introduced in each case. A 
plausible theory for each defendant's innocence intertwined 
with a written description of the facts of the case was 
given to each defendant and his attorney. In the same 
manner, a plausible theory for each defendant's guilt,
coupled with those same case facts, was provided for each
prosecuting attorney and his or her witness. The scope of 
each case was narrowed to examine a single offense (no 
multiple charges), and extraneous variables were removed as 
much as possible, in part by the use of fictitious names and 
set tings.
The crimes of bribery and auto theft were chosen 
because the first had previously been found to be congruent 
with both occupations of lawyer and politician, while the
18
latter was found to be incongruent with those same 
occupations (Helgeson & Shaver, 1983). In that research 
congruence had been measured by subjects' perceived 
likelihood that a person in a designated occupation would 
commit a specific crime. When rated on a scale from 0 (no 
chance) to 10 (100% chance), the mean scores for a lawyer's 
and politician's commission of bribery were 6.14 and 8.14, 
respectively. Conversely, the mean scores for a lawyer's 
and politician's commission of auto theft were 1.65 and 
2.05. Because the occupations of lawyer and politician had 
been differentially described by subjects, both were used to 
extend the generality of the results. In the same manner, 
two cases were created for each crime to remove any case- 
specific artifacts and introduce a degree of generality 
across the crime. Thus, the two cases of bribery and the 
two cases of auto theft were run once with the defendant 
described as a lawyer and once with the defendant described 
as a politician.
Although measures had been taken to insure that 
congruence alone was being manipulated and that effects 
would not be attributable to differences between occupations 
or differences between the two particular crimes, a final 
precaution was taken to include a third version of each case 
with no occupation stated for the defendant. Differences 
between the two versions of the cases with an occupation and 
the third versions without an occupation would provide 
further information about the effectiveness of the
19
congruence manipulation. In addition, the severity of each 
offense was varied: The bribe was $400 in one case and
$5000 in the other, while the car stolen was a Buick in one 
case and a Ferrari in the other (in each instance the large 
magnitude is roughly 10 times the small magnitude). In 
summary, 12 cases were created, two versions each (small and 
large in magnitude) of two crimes (bribery— auto theft), 
each run with the defendant as a lawyer, politician, and 
without an occupation.
All of the four defendants and four prosecution 
witnesses were male, so that the sex of the defendants and 
the witnesses would not enter into the design. These 
persons were volunteers from the first year class of law 
students. Four males and four females from the third year 
law class served as attorneys as part of a trial advocacy 
class requirement. The sex of the attorney, however, was 
held constant within each case. Therefore, a male defense 
and prosecuting attorney were used for two cases, one 
involving each crime; a female defense and prosecuting 
attorney were used for two cases, one also involving each 
crime. These attorneys were matched on their tactical 
skills by persons affiliated with the law school. The 
judge's role in all four cases was performed by the same 
male law professor. With the exception of this professor, 
all participants were blind to the hypotheses of the 
research.
Each of the four cases was run once in the recently
20
constructed law school's Moot Court Room. This room was 
specifically designed to combine the setting of a 
traditional court room with state-of-the art videotaping and 
presentation facilities. The walls behind the judge's bench 
are elegantly wood-paneled, all of the witness and jury box 
chairs are plush, and the room is fully carpeted. Lights 
are provided from a large translucent panel in the ceiling, 
and video cameras that can be remote-focused on any part of 
the room are concealed in turrets descending from this 
ceiling. All of the taping equipment and controls are in a 
control room behind the gallery at the rear of the room.
This room is the equal of almost any court room, and it is 
fair to say that it helped to make the videotapes of the 
trials extremely realistic. Those videotapes were later 
shown to subjects on jury box monitors in the room and the 
formality of the setting most probably encouraged the 
subjects to take their task quite seriously.
Videotapes were used for two reasons. First, because 
the trials were not rehearsed, taping permitted the trial to 
be stopped to rectify any mistakes in the interpretation of 
the facts, or errors in manipulation of the independent 
variables. Second, the trials were taped so that editing 
could create three versions of each trial, one with the 
defendant assigned the occupation of lawyer, one with the 
defendant as a politician, and one in which the occupation 
was not mentioned. This would ensure that the three 
versions of the cases were identical except for the factor
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manipulated, defendant occupation.
The occupation of the defendant was introduced at two 
different points during the trial. Because the study 
focused on the effect of a biasing factor on the presumption 
of innocence, it was important for this biasing factor to be 
introduced as early as possible. All of the trials began 
with the same version of the judge's initial opening 
remarks, including a presumption of innnocence instruction 
for the jurors. Then the judge tailored his introduction of 
the defendant and the charge to each case. Three versions 
of each case were subsequently described:
1. The defendant, Michael Byrne, an attorney 
at law, has been indicted for bribing a 
public officer.
2. The defendant, Michael Byrne, a state 
representative, has been indicted for 
bribing a public officer.
3. The defendant, Michael Byrne, has been 
indicted for bribing a public officer.
Unless there was to be no occupation included, the 
defendant's occupation was repeated when the defendant first 
took the stand. The defense attorney simply asked the 
defendant to state his name and then his occupation. Where 
appropriate, the answer included either "an attorney at law" 
or "a state representative." There was no other mention of 
the defendant's occupation at any other time during the 
trial.
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After the judge's initial introduction to the case, the 
defense attorney made his or her opening remarks, followed 
by a statement from the prosecuting attorney. Each defense 
attorney reminded jurors of the three aspects of the 
presumption of innocence: (a) that the defendant is
presumed to be innocent, (b) that the prosecution must 
prove each and every element of the offense, and (c) that 
the prosecution must prove each element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. After the opening statements, 
the prosecution introduced his or her case by calling a 
witness to the stand. The defense attorney cross-examined 
the witness and the prosecution's case was concluded. At 
some point prior to this conclusion, the prosecuting 
attorney offered stipulations of fact and the judge 
explained the meaning of these to the jury. The defense 
attorney then began his or her case by calling the defendant 
to the stand. After the cross-examination of the defendant 
and an opportunity for re-cross, closing arguments were 
made. The order for closing arguments was prosecution, 
defense, prosecution (the latter optional, but taken in 
three of the four cases). The judge then instructed the 
jury on the law and reminded them of their duty to apply the 
law to the facts of the case. Next, the judge explained the 
relevant elements of the offense in each of the four cases, 
and an additional presumption of innocence instruction was 
included. This delivery was taped once and attached to the 
end of the 12 trials. Attorneys made objections during the
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trial as required by the proceedings. As finally taped, 
each trial lasted between 50 and 65 minutes.
Procedure
Subjects were seated in the jury box of the Moot Court 
Room upon arrival, while consent forms and stimulus booklets 
were distributed. Television monitors, located in the jury 
box between every one or two seats, presented the trials. 
Subjects were told that they would be watching a videotaped 
presentation of an actual criminal case tried by law 
students as part of their curriculum. They were told that 
the focus of the study was on the use of videotape equipment 
in the courtroom and given some explanation as to the 
importance of this research. Subjects were then informed 
that the videotape would be stopped at several points during 
the trial so that they could answer a series of questions 
about the defendant's guilt or innocence. After written 
consent was obtained (no subject refused to take part), 
subjects were told to act as if they were actual jurors 
deciding a criminal case and to pay close attention to all 
of the information provided on the videotape. The 
experimenter then explained that because of the 
inaccessibility of real jurors and criminal trials, studies 
like the present one were extremely important. Subjects 
were also told that they would be deliberating at the end of 
the trial and that further instructions would be given at 
that t i m e .
The tape was started and stopped at the end of the
24
judge's opening remarks, immediately following the 
description of the defendant and the charge. Subjects were 
told to answer the questions in Part 1 of the booklet only. 
When all of the subjects had completed these questions, the 
videotape was resumed. The tape was again stopped at the 
close of the prosecution's case, preceding the testimony of 
the defendant. After all subjects had completed Part 2 of 
the booklet, the rest of the trial was shown. At the end of 
the tape, subjects were instructed to answer the questions 
contained in Part 3 of the booklet only.
Next, the deliberation was arranged. If more than 12 
subjects were in a session, six male and six female subjects 
were randomly chosen to deliberate. For 2 of the 12 
sessions this was not possible —  five males and seven 
females deliberated. The remaining subjects in the 
courtroom were allowed to complete the final set of 
questions in Part 4, and instructed to write "did not 
deliberate" on the front of the booklets. Across the 
conditions, a total of 25 subjects did not deliberate.
Next, one subject from the 12 to deliberate was 
randomly assigned to be foreman. The task of the foreman 
was made explicit —  to conduct the deliberation and return 
a unanimous verdict. The method by which this was to be 
achieved was intentionally not addressed, so that the 
subjects would use their own discretion. A maximum time of 
30 minutes was allotted for deliberation. The 12 subjects 
were taken into a jury room just outside of the courtroom
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for deliberation. This carpeted jury room is as formal as 
the court room, containing a long conference table and plush 
chairs, and its walls are lined with wooden bookcases filled 
with law books. A tape recorder was concealed behind one 
set of books, so that the deliberations could be secretly 
recorded. Unfortunately, the sound quality of the tapes was 
not sufficient to permit detailed content analysis of the 
deliberations. In two of the trials a verdict had not been
returned at the end of the 30 minutes. At this time, the
experimenter informed the subjects that they would have an 
additional five minutes to reach a two-thirds majority.
Both of the juries were able to comply with this request.
Upon the return of the jury and the foreman's pronouncement
of the verdict, all subjects completed Part 4 of the 
booklets. Because of subjects' comments about the attorneys 
in the first three trials, subjects in the remaining nine 
trials were told to rate the overall quality of each
attorney on a scale from 0 to 10.
There was a brief interim for questions, after which 
subjects were thoroughly debriefed. Subjects were thanked
for their participation, asked not to discuss the experiment
with anyone until the study had been completed, and then 
dismissed. Each experimental session lasted between 90 
minutes and two hours , depending on the length of 
deliberation.
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Re sult s
Overview of the Analysis
The data were analyzed by a 3 (occupation of the 
defendant) by 2 (crime) by 2 (subject sex) by 2 (magnitude 
of the offense) analysis of variance. Planned comparison 
tests were performed on main effects for crime to determine 
differences between the two crimes in only those conditions 
where an occupation was assigned to the defendant. 
Significant effects from this test would be attributable to 
the congruence of the crime to the occupation of the 
defendant. In addition, Tukey's HSD post-hoc comparison 
test (Kirk, 1982) was performed on main effects for the 
defendant's occupation with a critical value of .05.
Many of the dependent measures for the presumption of 
innocence were administered at several different points 
during the trial. Except for the ratings of the initial 
probability of guilt and confidence measures of those 
ratings, which were given at all four times of measurement, 
most of the questions were only asked twice —  once at the 
start of the trial and once at the end of the trial. Before 
examining the pattern of response to these repeated 
questions, each of the four times of measurement in the 
trial will be discussed separately. Although all of the 169 
subjects completed the set of dependent measures at all four 
times of measurement, only 144 of the 169 subjects 
deliberated. Because no significant differences were found 
between those subjects who deliberated and those who did not
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deliberate on the dependent measures, all of the analyses 
were performed including only those subjects who 
deliberated. Tables will present the mean scores for 
dependent variables for which there were significant effects 
at each time of measurement and/or across the four times of 
measurement. Because some subjects chose not to answer one 
or two questions the degrees of freedom for the individual 
measurement times will vary.
Checks on Manipulations
To begin with, the magnitude of both crimes had been 
varied —  bribery of $400 or $5000, and theft of a Buick or 
a Ferrari. To determine whether these differences were 
noticed, subjects were asked after deliberation to give the 
amount of the bribe or the kind of car stolen. Subjects 
accurately reported the $400 bribe and the Ferrari car 100% 
of the time. The larger bribe of $5000 was specified 
correctly 97% of the time and the Buick was reported 
correctly 86% of the time. Overall, it appears that 
subjects noticed the magnitude of the crime. Preliminary 
analyses taking magnitude into account, however, failed to 
yield any significant effects on the dependent measures 
attributable to the magnitude of the offense. Awareness of 
the differences in magnitude was apparently not sufficient 
to alter subjects' responses. Consequently, all the 
remaining analyses for the presumption of innocence —  
congruence manipulation check and dependent variables —  
were performed excluding magnitude of the offense.
28
To increase the generality of the results, congruence 
had been operationalized as agreement between crime and 
occupation for two different occupations —  lawyer and 
politician. For this reason it was important to show that 
the manipulation of congruence was equally effective for 
each occupation, while being different from a condition in 
which no occupation was given. Subjects were expected to be 
more surprised when the defendant (a lawyer or politician) 
was charged with a crime incongruent to his occupation than 
a crime congruent to his occupation, while no differences 
were expected between the two crimes for the defendant who 
had not been assigned an occupation. As predicted, when 
subjects were asked "Given the occupation of this defendant, 
how surprised or not surprised were you that he was charged 
with that particular crime?" an interaction between the 
crime and the occupation of the defendant occurred, F (2,
131) = 10.95, p < .001. A planned comparison test 
collapsing across the two occupations and differentiating 
between crimes showed that subjects were more surprised at a 
lawyer or politician charged with auto theft (M = 5.79) than 
bribery (M = 3.91), F (1, 137) = 18.08, _p < .001. A second 
planned comparison test showed, as intended, that there were 
no differences between the occupations of lawyer or 
politician. Unexpectedly, there was a greater surprise at 
the no occupation defendant charged with bribery (M = 5.71) 
than auto theft (M = 4.13), F (1, 137) = 6-47, p < .05.
This difference, however, was in the opposite direction of
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the congruence manipulation. There was also a main effect 
for sex on this manipulation check, F (1, 131) = 11.55, p <
.001. Females reported more surprise at any defendant 
charged with a crime (M = 5.45) than males (M = 4.28).
Thus, with this minor exception, the congruence manipulation 
was perceived as intended. The means for this manipulation 
check are shown in Table 1.
Insert Table 1 about here
To further support the congruence manipulation and 
insure that effects were not due to a greater likelihood of 
guilt for any defendant charged with bribery compared to 
auto theft, subjects were first asked to write down a 
percentage from 0 to 100 in response to the question "What 
proportion of defendants charged with (auto theft/bribery) 
and brought to trial do you think are guilty?" There was a 
main effect for the crime, F (1, 130) = 6.14, jp < .01. This
presents no problems to the research, however, and in fact 
operates against the hypothesis, because a higher percentage 
of defendants charged with auto theft, the incongruent 
crime, were thought to be guilty (M = 73.27) than those 
charged with bribery, the congruent crime, (M = 66.99).
There was also a significant main effect for sex on this 
question, F (1, 130) = 5.34, p < .05. Females believed more
defendants were guilty of either crime (M = 72.81) than 
males (M = 67.29). The means for this and the following
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proportion of guilty defendants are shown in Table 2.
Insert Table 2 about here
A more direct measure of the effectiveness of the 
congruence manipulation was a question asking subjects what 
proportion of defendants in the assigned occupation charged 
with the specific crime were guilty. Only subjects who
viewed a defendant with a specified occupation answered this
question. As expected, a main effect for crime was found, F 
(1, 84) = 12.91, p < .001, in the predicted direction. More 
lawyers and politicians charged with bribery -- the 
congruent crime —  were believed to be guilty (M = 70.72) 
than when charged with auto theft —  the incongruent crime 
(M = 54.69). This further supported the congruence 
manipulation. An unintended main effect, however, appeared 
for the occupation of the defendant, F (1 , 84) *= 4 .84, _p < 
.05, such that fewer lawyers were considered guilty (M =
58.13) than politicians (M = 67.84). In addition, a main 
effect for subject sex appeared, similar to that on the 
previous measure, _F ( 1 , 84) = 3 .99 , _p < .05. Females
believed more defendants in both occupations were guilty (M 
= 66.73) than males (M = 58.68).
To insure that crime congruence effects were not 
confounded with crime severity, subjects were asked how 
serious they felt the crime was. There were no effects for 
sex, crime, or occupation on this measure. The marginal
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mean was 6.24, suggesting that both crimes were viewed as 
moderately serious.
Presumption of Innocence
Time 1: After Opening Instructions. After viewing the
initial judicial instructions given by the judge, including 
opening remarks, specific presumption of innocence 
instructions, and the introduction of the crime with which 
the defendant in a particular occupation had been charged 
(if one was assigned), subjects responded to several 
questions measuring their judgment of the probability of the 
defendant's innocence or guilt and their confidence in those 
j udgment s .
Subjects first responded to the question "After being 
indicted and initially brought to trial, what is the 
probability that at the beginning of the trial this 
defendant is guilty as charged?" on a scale ranging from 0 
representing 0% to 10 representing 100%. There was a main 
effect for sex, (1 , 132) = 10.28, ]? < .005 , with females 
expressing a greater initial probability of guilt (M = 3.95) 
than males (M = 2.46). It must be noted, however, that both 
of these scale values were quite low. This effect was 
qualified by an interaction between sex and the occupation 
of the defendant that approached significance, IF (1, 132) =
2.99, p < .06. While both males and females rated the 
politician's initial guilt similarly (means for males and 
females were 3.29 and 3.21, respectively), females rated 
both the lawyer and the no occupation defendant more guilty
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than males (means for lawyer and no occupation were 4.12 and 
4.48, respectively for the females; means for lawyer and no 
occupation were 1.57 and 2.48, respectively for the males). 
The means for this first measure of the defendant's initial 
probability of guilt at all four times of measurement are 
shown in Table 3.
Insert Table 3 about here
By contrast, when subjects were asked how confident 
they were in this judgment, males reported more confidence 
(M = 6.50) than females (M * 4.86), F (1, 131) = 14.61, p < 
.001. The means for this question are shown in Table 4 at 
all four times of measurement.
Insert Table 4 about here
There were no other main effects or interactions for sex, 
crime, or occupation on these questions.
When subjects were asked, "How much evidence do you 
believe the prosecution will have to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt in order to convict this defendant?", no 
effects were found for any of the variables introduced. 
Subjects overall responded with a mean of 7.01 on a nine- 
point scale extending from none to extremely much. The 
means for this question along with the other dependent 
measures of the presumption of innocence taken at both the
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start of the trial and after deliberation are shown in Table 
5 .
Insert Table 5 about here
A third measure of the presumption of innocence 
required subjects to respond to the question, "If evidence 
is introduced against this defendant that raises strong 
suspicions about the defendant, what do you believe would be 
the probability that he is guilty?" on a scale extending 
from 0 (0%) to 10 (100%). A main effect for sex appeared, F 
(1, 126) = 6.52, p < .05, such that females reported a 
higher probability of guilt (M = 6.90) than males (M =
6.07). No other effects appeared for sex, crime, or 
occupation on this meas u r e .
When asked, "How much evidence do you believe the 
defendant will have to offer in his defense in order to 
prove innocence?" there were no significant main effects 
for sex, crime, or occupation. There was, however, a 
significant sex by occupation interaction, F (2, 129) =
4.09, p < .05. On a scale ranging from none (1) to
extremely much (9), female subjects reported that the lawyer 
and no occupation defendants would have to produce more 
evidence (means for lawyer and no occupation defendant were 
6.44 and 6.08, respectively) than the politician (M = 4.92). 
For males, the reverse occurred: more evidence was required
from the politician (M = 6.08) than the lawyer (M = 5.24) or
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the no occupation defendant (M = 4.74). Thus, it appears 
that males and females perceived defendants in these 
occupations differently in at least one important respect.
Subjects also responded to the question "If this 
defendant refuses to testify in his behalf, what do you 
believe is the probability that he is guilty?" on a 
percentage scale of 0 (0%) to 10 (100%). As on the previous 
measures, a main effect for sex occurred, F (1, 131) =
11.07, _p < .001. Females reported a higher probability of
guilt if the defendant refused to testify (M = 6.78) than 
did males (M = 5.29). When subjects were asked to rate 
their confidence in this judgment on a scale extending from 
not at all confident (1) to extremely confident (9), a main 
effect for sex again appeared, similar in nature to that on 
the first question, IF (1, 132) = 4.07 , j> < .05. Males 
reported more confidence (M = 6.46) than females (M = 5.77). 
There was also a significant triple interaction between sex, 
crime, and occupation on this confidence measure, F (2, 132) 
= 4.00, p < .05. This interaction was largely due to the
females rating themselves least confident about the no 
occupation defendant committing bribery (M = 4.25) in 
comparison to the ratings of the other defendants, while 
males rated themselves the most confident in assessing the 
no occupation defendant charged with bribery (M = 7.25) in 
comparison to the ratings of the other defendants.
In addition, subjects were asked at this point in the 
trial what they thought their decision would be at the end
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of the trial. The 144 subjects fairly equally split the 
vote: 45% chose guilty, 47% responded not guilty, and 8%
elected not to answer. While subjects seemed evenly divided 
between guilt and innocence in predicting their future 
behavior, the mean score for the initial probability of 
guilt was far below the midpoint of the scale for both males 
and females. Thus, a frequency distribution was constructed 
for that first initial probability of guilt question. 
Inspection of these data revealed that 39% of the subjects 
responded with a 0% probability of guilt (the theoretically 
accurate response of one who presumes innocence) and 29% 
responded with a 5 representing a 50% likelihood of guilt (a 
"fairness" reflecting an equal chance of innocence or 
guilt). These responses may account for the marginal mean 
of 3.22. More importantly, 27% of the subjects who gave an 
initial 0% probability of guilt also predicted that they 
would vote guilty. This discrepancy may reveal some of the 
social desirability constraints in such an explicit measure 
of the presumption of innocence. Indeed the actual scale 
means for the probability of guilt sought in this question 
are lower than the other less obvious measures of the 
presumption of innocence. Nevertheless, a significant 
correlation was found between this initial probability of
guilt measure and the anticipated verdict, r .(132) = .42, p
- Pb
< .001.
To assess whether differences in anticipated verdicts 
occurred across'cases, a chi-squared analysis was performed.
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No differences appeared between the cases.
Next, subjects were asked to rate how confident they 
were in their predicted verdicts on a nine-point scale 
ranging from not at all confident to extremely confident. 
There were no effects for sex, crime, or occupation for this 
question at this time of measurement. The means for this 
confidence rating for the three times of measurement 
preceding deliberation are shown in Table 6.
Insert Table 6 about here
Two additional questions were asked to probe subjects' 
beliefs about their own bias and impartiality in the trial, 
similar to those asked of potential jurors during voir dire. 
Subjects responded to the question "Do you think, regardless 
of any initial feelings you might have, that you will be 
able to give this defendant a fair and impartial hearing," 
on a scale ranging from "certainly could not" (scored as 1) 
to "certainly could" (scored as 9). The only effect 
occurred for subject sex, F (1, 132) = 5.56, p < .05, such 
that males felt they could be more impartial (M = 8.44) than 
females (M = 8.01). A more subtle assessment of bias was 
contained in a second question that asked subjects, "Do you 
think most people would have an initial bias against this 
defendant?", rated on a scale ranging from "very few people" 
(1) to "nearly all people" (9). No effects involving sex, 
crime, or occupation occurred. The marginal mean of 5.15
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indicated that subjects felt a moderate number of other 
people would be biased. Thus, it seems that subjects had 
more faith in their own abilities to set aside biases than 
they had in others. Males" firmer beliefs in their own 
impartiality coincide with the higher confidence ratings of 
their judgments. The means for these measures of subject 
bias taken both at the start of the trial and following 
deliberation are shown in Table 7.
Insert Table 7 about here
The initial attributions for criminal behavior were 
examined by three questions that asked subjects to what 
extent the defendant (described by his occupation, if 
appropriate) would commit the offense with which he had been 
charged due to an enduring character flaw, to the temporary 
circumstances, and to acting in a manner different from his 
normal behavior. All of these questions were rated on nine- 
point scales with larger numbers representing a greater 
attribution to the particular category. It was first 
predicted that there would be a greater attribution made to 
a character flaw when the defendant was charged with a crime 
congruent to his occupation compared to a crime incongruent 
to his occupation and this prediction was generally 
confirmed. A main effect for crime appeared, F_ (1, 126) =
5.96, _p < .05, as subjects made greater attributions to a
character flaw when the defendant was charged with bribery
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(H = 5.00) than auto theft (M = 4.16). A planned comparison 
of the means between the two crimes Including only the 
defendants with an occupation, showed that as expected a 
greater amount was attributed to the character flaw of 
lawyers and politicians charged with bribery (M = 5.32) than 
auto theft (M =* 4.32), F (1, 134) = 6.04, j> < .05. A 
planned comparison between the two crimes for the no 
occupation defendant did not reveal a significant 
difference. There was, however, a greater attribution to 
the character flaw of a politician (M = 5.27) than a lawyer 
(M = 4.35) F (1, 134) = 5.06, p < .05. There was also a 
main effect for the defendant's occupation, F (2, 126) =
4.25, £ < .05. A post-hoc comparison test showed that there 
was a greater attribution made to the character flaw of the 
politician (M = 5.27) than the no occupation defendant (M =
4.13). The means for all three attributional measures taken 
both at the start of the trial and fo11owing deliberation 
are shown in Table 8.
Insert Table 8 about here
For the second attributional measure, it was expected 
that a greater amount would be attributed to circumstances 
for the defendant in an occupation charged with auto theft 
than bribery. No effects appeared involving the crime or 
the defendant's occupation. There was, however, a marginal 
main effect for sex on this measure, F (1, 126) = 3.77, p <
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.06. There was a trend for females to make a greater 
attribution to circumstances (M = 6.49) than males (H = 
5.58).
It was predicted for the last attributional measure 
that a greater amount would be attributed to atypical 
behavior when the defendant in an occupation was charged 
with auto theft than bribery. The expectation was confirmed 
in part as this question yielded a main effect for crime, _F 
(1, 126) = 5.26, p < .05, such that defendants charged with
auto theft were considered to have done so while acting in a 
manner different from normal behavior (M = 6.09) more than 
defendants charged with bribery (M = 5.34). The expected 
congruence effect appeared in the planned comparison of the 
two crimes across the two occupations, 3? (1 , 132) = 8.46, ;p 
< .005. More was attributed to lawyers' and politicians' 
acting in a manner different from normal behavior when they 
were charged with auto theft, the incongruent crime, (M = 
7.00) than with bribery, the congruent crime (M = 5.87). 
Again, no differences were detected between the two crimes 
for the no occupation defendant. There was an additional 
main effect for the occupation of the defendant, F (2, 126)
= 20.00, p < .001. A post-hoc comparison test showed that a 
greater attribution was made to atypical behavior when the 
defendant held either the occupation of lawyer (M = 6.44) or 
politician (M = 6.40) than if no occupation had been 
assigned (M = 4.28), suggesting that any occupation might 
carry with it a set of expectations about what is "typical."
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Finally, correlations were computed for all three of 
the attributional measures. The only significant 
correlation resulted between the attributions to 
circumstances and to atypical behavior, r(138) = .32, p <
. 01 .
The results from the first time of measurement indicate 
that the congruence dimension, manipulated through the 
occupation of the defendant and the charge, was accurately 
perceived, although some differences did appear between the 
lawyer and the politician. These differences, however, 
seemed to be in degree rather than direction. No effects 
emerged for crime on these initial presumption of innocence 
measures, nor did interactions between crime and occupation 
occur. Consistent effects for subject sex, however, 
appeared. Females appeared to have a greater initial bias, 
while males reported more confidence in their assessments. 
While the attributions to character flaw were greater for 
the congruent crime than the incongruent crime, a greater 
amount was attributed to atypical behavior if the crime had 
been incongruent rather than congruent to the occupation of 
the defendant.
The dependent measures at this first time of 
measurement constitute the point at which much of the jury 
research ends. Subjects are typically provided with 
information about a defendant and/or a crime, and the 
research is concluded with subjects' single judgments of 
probabilities of guilt or verdicts. In this research,
4 1
however, the entire trial was presented and multiple 
assessments were made.
Time 2: After P r o s e c u t i o n ^  Case. After viewing
opening statements made by both attorneys and the 
prosecution's presentation of the evidence (consisting of a 
single witness), subjects were again asked to rate the 
probability of the defendant's guilt, predict verdicts, and 
assess their confidence in these judgments.
When subjects were asked to estimate the probability 
that the defendant was guilty at this point in the trial, an 
interaction occurred between sex and crime, I? (1, 132) =
4.12, p < .05. While females rated the defendant charged 
with bribery as slightly more guilty (M = 4.33) than the 
defendant charged with auto theft (M = 4.18), the direction 
was reversed for males. Males rated the defendant charged 
with auto theft as more guilty (M = 3.64) than the defendant 
charged with bribery (M = 3.31). These means are shown in 
Table 3. When subjects rated their confidence in these 
judgments, again a main effect for sex was found, similar to 
those that appeared in the first time of measurement, (1,
132) = 10.67, p < .001. Males were more confident in their
judgments (M = 6.76) than females (M = 5.73). The means for 
this dependent measure are shown in Table 4.
Because subjects had only heard the prosecution's side 
of the case at this point, it might be expected that the 
number of anticipated guilty verdicts would have increased 
from the number at the start of the trial. Instead, the
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number of anticipated guilty verdicts decreased. If the 
trial were to have been decided at this point, 79% of the 
subjects would have voted not guilty while 20% would have 
voted guilty (1% of the subjects did not answer this 
question). Again, the anticipation of a guilty verdict 
significantly correlated with this second measure of the 
defendant's guilt, r^(142) = .64, p < .001. A chi-squared 
analysis on these verdicts across the four cases revealed no 
differences. Thus, it seems that the prosecution's case was 
not very strong (or strong enough) in any of the cases, 
because it alone could not convict a defendant. Subjects' 
ratings of their confidence in the anticipated verdict 
revealed a main effect for sex, I? (1, 130) = 5.13, p < .05.
Males expressed more confidence in their predicted verdicts 
(M = 6.43) than did females (M = 5.56). These means are 
shown in Table 6.
Thus, during this phase of the trial the number of 
expected not guilty verdicts substantially increased across 
cases. The cases were perceived similarly and the effects 
that emerged for sex were similar to those previously 
reported.
Time 3: After Charge to Jury. The third assessment
was identical in format to the second, but was given at the 
end of the trial after the defendant's testimony, closing 
arguments by both attorneys, and the judge's charge to the 
jury (including a reiteration of the presumption of 
innocence instruction).
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At the end of trial, no main effects or interactions 
for sex, crime, or occupation appeared for the probability 
that the defendant was guilty, nor were any effects found 
for the subjects' confidence in their assessment. The 
previously consistent main effect for sex on confidence 
measures also did not occur.
The number of anticipated not guilty verdicts increased 
to 83% while anticipated guilty verdicts decreased to 17%. 
The predicted guilty verdict was strongly correlated with 
the defendant's probability of guilt at this time of
measurement, r i(144) = .80, p < .001. A chi-squared
—p b  —
analysis of the verdicts revealed an effect for the case 
version, X (3, n = 144) = 9.83, p < .05. The percentage of 
not guilty verdicts for the $5000 bribe, the $400 bribe, the 
Ferrari theft, and the Buick theft were respectively, 97%, 
75%, 86%, and 72%; guilty verdicts were 3%, 25%, 14%, and 
28%, respectively. It should be noted that these verdicts 
are exactly the opposite of what might be expected on the 
basis of magnitude of the crime. In addition, no 
differences were found for sex, crime, or occupation on 
subjects' confidence in their predicted verdict.
Time 4: After Deliberatio n . Subjects were informed
that they had 30 minutes to return a unanimous verdict. At 
the end of this time period, 10 of the 12 juries had 
returned verdicts of Not Guilty. The other two juries had 
not reached a unanimous decision at this point. When they 
were given an additional five minutes to reach a two-thirds
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majority, however, both returned majority verdicts in favor 
of acquittal. Thus, the defendant was found Not Guilty by a 
unanimous or two-thirds majority in all 12 trials.
Deliberation times ranged from 8 to 35 minutes, with an
average time of 19.17 minutes.
In completing the last portion of the questionnaire, 
subjects were first asked what the probability of guilt was 
for the defendant at the start of the trial. Contrary to 
expectations, defendants were not perceived in retrospect 
differentially due to their charge or occupation. The main 
effect for sex, however, did reappear, F^ (1, 131) = 6.11, jp
< .05. Females restated that they believed the defendant 
was more likely to be guilty (M = 4.09) than did males (M = 
2.93). The means for this question of initial guilt at Time
4 are reported in Table 3.
Subjects were again asked to rate the confidence of 
their judgments. A similar main effect for sex occurred, I? 
(1, 131) = 6.45, p < .05, with males expressing more
confidence (M = 7.00) than females (M = 6.01), even after 
deliberation. There was also a marginal main effect for 
occupation on this last confidence measure, 1? (2, 131) =
3.02, p < .06. A post-hoc comparison test showed that
subjects expressed the most confidence when the defendant 
was a lawyer (M = 7.02) rather than a politician (M = 5.93), 
while confidence in judging the no occupation defendant did 
not significantly differ from the two (M = 6.65). The means 
for this confidence measure are shown in Table 4.
The second dependent measure of the presumption of 
innocence, requiring subjects to report how much evidence 
the prosecution needed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was guilty, again revealed no main effect 
or interactions for sex, crime, or defendant occupation.
The means for this question and the rest of the presumption 
of innocence dependent measures taken at Time 4 are shown in 
Table 5.
In response to the probability of the defendant's guilt 
if evidence were introduced that raised strong suspicions, a 
single effect appeared for subject sex, _F (1, 129) - 8.41, p
< .005. Consistent with previous behavior, females reported 
a higher probability of guilt (M = 6.67) than males (M = 
5.62) .
When asked how much evidence the defendant needed to 
prove his innocence, a single main effect for the 
defendant's occupation emerged, F (2, 132) = 4.32, p < .05.
A post—hoc comparison test revealed that significantly less 
evidence was required from the lawyer (M = 3.50) than from 
the politician (M = 4.90), whereas the no occupation 
defendant did not significantly differ from the two (M = 
4.09).
When subjects were asked in retrospect what the 
probability of guilt would be if the defendant had not 
testified, a main effect for sex appeared, ]? (1, 132) =
4.83, p < .05. Consistent with previous results, females
reported a higher probability of guilt (M = 6.49) than males
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(M = 5.49).
Subjects were again asked to assess their own 
impartiality. When subjects were asked if they were able to 
give the defendant a fair and impartial hearing, a single 
interaction between sex and occupation emerged, F (2, 131) =
3.55, p < .05. While females felt they could be most
impartial to a defendant who had not been assigned an 
occupation (M = 8.72), than either a lawyer (M = 8.08) or a 
politician (M = 8.25), males felt they could be more 
impartial towards a lawyer (M = 8.43) or a politician (M = 
8.61) than a no occupation defendant (M = 8.04). The means 
for subjects' own impartiality are shown in Table 7. There 
were no effects involving sex, crime, or occupation on 
subjects' perceptions of bias in others.
Attributions for the commission of the crime were also 
assessed at the end of the trial. The attribution to an 
enduring flaw in character revealed a main effect for crime, 
similar to that detected during the first time of 
measurement, F (1, 130) = 8.13, _p < .005. A greater amount
was attributed to character flaw when the defendant was 
charged with bribery (M = 4.72) than with auto theft (M = 
3.77). Planned comparison tests showed, however, that this 
same difference occurred within each of the defendants who 
held an occupation, along with the no occupation defendant. 
The means for all of the attributional measures at Time 4 
are shown in Table 8.
Contrary to expectations, the second attributional
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question measuring the extent to which the temporary 
circumstances were responsible for the behavior revealed no 
effects for sex, crime, or occupation.
When subjects were asked to attribute the commission of 
the crime to atypical behavior, a main effect for crime 
emerged almost identical to that found during the first time 
of measurement, F (1, 130) = 3.95, p < .05. A greater 
attribution was made to atypical behavior for auto theft (M 
= 6.04) than bribery (M = 5.30). A planned comparison again 
revealed a trend for a lawyer or politician to commit auto 
theft, the incongruent crime, due to atypical behavior (M = 
6.15) more than bribery, the congruent crime, (M = 5.44), 1? 
(1, 136) = 3.52, p < .07. A planned comparison between the
two crimes for the no occupation defendant did not reveal a 
significant difference.
Correlations were again computed for the three 
attributional measures taken at the end of the trial. A 
single negative correlation resulted between the 
attributions to character flaw and atypical behavior, _r(140) 
= -.25, p < .05.
Repeated Measures and Trend Analyses. Orthogonal 
decomposition of the initial probability of the defendant's 
guilt across all four times of measurement revealed a 
significant cubic trend, F (1, 131) = 21.80, _p < .001, which
was qualified by an interaction between sex and crime, F^ (1, 
131) = 5.72, p < .05. The trend indicated that initial
guilt at the start of the trial peaked after the prosecution
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presented evidence, returned to its initial level at the end 
of the trial, and slightly increased after deliberation 
(means across times were, respectively, 3.24, 4.12, 3.24, 
3.53). The interaction first suggested that the trend was 
more dramatic for males' judgments of auto theft and 
females' judgments of bribery. In addition, while both 
males and females judged defendants charged with bribery as 
more guilty than defendants charged with auto theft, the 
reverse occurred for the second and third times of 
measurement: defendants charged with auto theft were rated
more guilty than defendants charged with bribery. Thus, if 
the measure detected any bias at all due to the congruence 
of the crime, it was evident only at the start of the trial 
and slowly dissipated with time. The means for the initial 
probability of guilt measure are shown in Table 3 for all 
four times of measurement.
While a linear and cubic trend were revealed through 
the orthogonal decomposition of subjects' confidence in 
their estimates of initial guilt across all four times of 
measurement, the significant quadratic trend best describes 
the data, F (1, 130) = 17.11, j> < .001. The mean ratings of 
confidence increased from Time 1 to Time 2 to Time 3, but 
surprisingly decreased after deliberation, Time 4 (means 
across times were, respectively, 5.64, 6.26, 7.36, 6.49). 
This quadratic trend was qualified by an interaction with 
sex, F (1, 130) = 4.10, p < .05. While males were more
confident than females during the first two times of
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measurement (means for male and female were 6.46 and 4.86, 
respectively at Time 1; means for male and female were 6.81 
and 5.74, respectively for Time 2), there was only a slight 
difference between males (M = 7.43) and females (M = 7.29) 
at Time 3. These latter means reflect the highest level of 
confidence expressed at any time of measurement for both 
males and females. But after deliberation, females' 
confidence showed a marked decrease (M = 6.01) while males" 
confidence slightly decreased (M = 7.00). The means for 
this confidence measure at all four times of measurement are 
shown in Table 4.
The remainder of the presumption of innocence dependent 
measures were taken only twice —  once at the beginning of 
the trial and once at the end. The repeated measures 
analysis comparing the amount of evidence the prosecution 
will have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt (Time 1) to the 
amount of evidence the prosecution needed to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt (Time 4) did reveal a single main effect 
for the repeated measure, (1, 130) = 42.09, j? < .001.
After deliberation subjects raised the criterion for beyond 
a reasonable doubt (M = 7.94) from their earlier suggestion 
(M = 7.02). The means for this question and the rest of the 
dependent measures for the presumption of innocence for 
which there were significant effects during the first and 
last times of measurement are shown in Table 5.
In comparing the estimated probability of the 
defendant's guilt at the start of the trial (should
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suspicious evidence be introduced) to that same measure at 
the end of the trial, the overall main effect for sex was 
replicated, (1, 125) = 9 .49, p < .005. Females 
consistently gave higher ratings of guilt (M = 6.79) than 
males (M = 5.85). There was also a main effect for the
repeated measure, F (1, 125) = 4.46, £ < .05. After
deliberation subjects reported a lower probability of guilt 
attributable to suspicious evidence (M = 6.15) than they 
previously had predicted at the start of the trial (M = 
6.51).
The repeated measures analysis across the two times of 
measurement for how much evidence the defendant need to 
prove his innocence first revealed a main effect for the 
repeated measure, IF (1 , 129) = 38.29 , £ < .001. The burden
of proof on the defendant was lowered after the trial (M =
4.20) compared to the initial prediction at the start of the
trial (M = 5.60). This effect was qualified by an 
interaction between the repeated measure and the occupation
of the defendant, F (2, 129) = 4.70, p < .05. Although the
amount of evidence needed to prove innocence was considered 
lower for all the defendants at the end of the trial, this 
difference was more dramatic for the lawyer (means for Time 
1 and Time 4 were 5.89 and 3.54, respectively) than the 
politician (means for Time 1 and Time 4 were 5.50 and 4.83, 
respectively) or the no occupation defendant (means for Time 
1 and Time 4 were 5.43 and 4.19, respectively).
There was an additional overall interaction between sex
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and defendant occupation, F (2, 129) = 4.64, p < .05. For 
females, less evidence was required from the politician (M =
4.75) than from the lawyer (M = 5.24) or from the no 
occupation defendant (M = 5.50). For males, however, the 
most evidence was required from the politician (M = 5.58), 
while there was little difference in that required from the 
lawyer (M = 4.10) or the no occupation defendant (M = 4.09).
The repeated measures analysis comparing the estimated 
probability of guilt had the defendant not testified at the 
end of the trial to the same probability measured at the 
start of the trial, revealed no effects involving the 
repeated measure. The overall main effect for sex held, F_ 
(1, 131) = 10.15, p < .005, with females rating higher 
probabilities of guilt (M = 6.63) than males (M = 5.39).
A linear trend was revealed through the orthogonal 
decomposition of subjects' confidence in their verdicts 
across the first three times of measurement, (1, 125) =
228.54, p < .001. Subjects were much more confident at the 
second and third times of measurement (means were 6.03 and 
7.49, respectively) than they were at the very start of the 
trial (M = 3.85). Thus, subjects became substantially more 
confident in their verdicts as evidence was produced. The 
means for these confidence measures are also shown in Table 
6 .
The overall interaction between sex and occupation for 
subjects' own feelings of impartiality was confirmed by the 
repeated measures analysis, F (2, 131) = 4.16, p < .05.
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While females felt they were/could be more impartial towards 
a defendant who was not assigned an occupation (M = 8.56) 
than a lawyer (M = 7.94) or a politician (M = 8.06), males 
believed themselves to be the most impartial when judging a 
politician (M = 8.61), somewhat less impartial for a lawyer 
(M = 8.39), and least impartial for the no occupation 
defendant (M = 8.20). Although no effects occurred for sex, 
crime, or occupation when subjects were asked at the end of 
the trial if others would have been biased, a main effect 
for the repeated measure occurred on subjects' estimates of 
others' bias, F (1, 131) = 4.83, p < .05. In retrospect, 
subjects felt fewer people would be biased after the trial 
(M = 4.73) than they had initially predicted (M = 5.15).
The means for these two questions are shown in Table 7.
The repeated measures analysis of the first 
attributional measure (character flaw) did not produce any 
effect involving the repeated measure, but did further 
support the overall crime effect, _F (1, 125) = 10.61, j> < 
.001, with a greater attribution made to bribery (M = 4.87) 
than auto theft (M = 3.96). A planned comparison test again 
showed that more was attributed to a flaw in the character 
of a lawyer and a politician charged with bribery (M = 5.07) 
than auto theft (M = 4.16), F (1, 133) = 6.55, p < .05. The
means for all three attributional measures at both times of 
measurement are presented in Table 8.
The repeated measures analysis for the second 
attributional measure, circumstances, produced a main effect
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for the repeated measure, F (1 ,125) = 20.19 , < .001.
While it might be expected that the trial scenario would 
draw out the contribution of circumstances to the commission 
of a crime, subjects instead attributed a smaller amount to 
circumstances after the trial (M = 5.33) than before the 
actual evidence had been presented (M = 6.18). This effect 
was qualified by an interaction between the repeated measure 
and crime, _F (1 , 125) = 4.04, p < .05. While a greater 
attribution was made to circumstances for bribery (M = 6.38) 
than auto theft (M = 5.97) during the first time of 
measurement, the attribution not only decreased overall 
during the second measurement, but the difference between 
bribery (M = 5.23) and auto theft (M = 5.49) virtually 
vanished. A three-way interaction between the repeated 
measure, crime, and sex also appeared, jF (1, 125) = 3.93, £
< .05. During the first time of measurement, females'
attributions to circumstances for both bribery and auto 
theft as well as males' attributions for bribery were all 
similar (means were 6.44, 6.51, and 6.31, respectively), 
while males' attributions for auto theft were much less (M = 
5.32). Again, while the attributions to circumstances were 
less during the second time of measurement, no difference 
appeared between females' attributions of bribery (M = 5.56) 
and auto theft (M = 5.54). Males not only rated auto theft 
(M = 5-42) similarly to the overall females' ratings, but 
greater than bribery (M = 4.91).
Attributions made to atypical behavior, not
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surprisingly, revealed an overall main effect for crime 
across the two times of measurement, F (1, 125) = 5.60, p <
.05, such that a greater attribution was made for auto theft 
(M = 6.02) than for bribery (M = 5.32). A planned 
comparison test demonstrated that more was attributed to 
atypical behavior if the defendant was charged with a crime 
incongruent to his occupation (M = 6.58) than if the crime 
was congruent to his occupation, (M = 5.70), F (1, 131) =
6.55, ]? < .05. An overall main effect for the occupation of 
the defendant appeared, similar to that noted in the first 
measurement, F (2, 125) = 10.24, p < .001. A post-hoc
comparison test revealed that greater attributions were made 
to atypical behavior when the defendant held the occupation 
of lawyer (M = 6.09) or politician (M = 6.17) compared to no 
occupation (M = 4.75). This effect was qualified by an 
interaction between the defendant's occupation and the 
repeated measure, ]? (2, 125) = 7 .83 , p < .001. The 
attributions to atypical behavior were highest for 
defendants who held occupations, but more so at the first 
time of measurement (means for lawyer and politician were 
6.44 and 6.50, respectively for Time 1; means for lawyer and 
politician were 5.74 and 5.85, respectively for Time 4).
For defendants who held no stated occupation during the 
first assessment the attribution was markedly lower (M = 
4.28) than for those who held occupations, whereas the 
difference was somewhat less during the fourth assessment (M 
= 5 .22) .
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Anciliary Dependent Measures. Several additional 
questions were asked of subjects at the end of the trial.
All subjects were included in these analyses because 
deliberation was not considered important to these items. 
First subjects rated on a nine— point scale how important 
they thought it was that the defendant's occupation be 
revealed during the trial. A main effect for crime 
occurred, F (1, 131) = 4.48, p < .05. Subjects believed it 
was more important to reveal the occupation when the 
defendant was charged with bribery (M = 6.01) than with auto 
theft (M = 5.19). A planned comparison test of the two 
crimes collapsing across the lawyer and the politician did 
not show any significant difference. This main effect for 
crime was qualified, however, by an interaction between the 
crime and occupation, F^ (2, 131) = 3.48, p < .05. Subjects 
believed it was more important to reveal the occupation of 
politician if the defendant was charged with bribery (M = 
6.65) than auto theft (M = 5.13). Similarly, subjects 
believed it was more important to reveal the occupation of a 
defendant, who had not been assigned an occupation, when he 
was charged with bribery (M = 6.42) compared to auto theft 
(M = 4.58). By contrast, there was little difference in the 
importance of the occupation of lawyer whether the defendant 
had been charged with bribery (M = 5.25) or auto theft (M = 
5.88). These means are shown in Table 9.
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Insert Table 9 about here
The most extreme form of bias against which the 
presumption of innocence attempts to guard is the belief 
that "Any person that has been indicted and is on trial is 
guilty." When subjects indicated at the end of the 
deliberation on a nine-point scale the extent to which they 
agreed with that statement, a significant interaction 
between the crime and the occupation of the defendant 
appeared, I? (2, 131) = 3.40, p < .05. Although there was 
little difference in agreement when faced with the lawyer or 
polltician charged with bribery or auto theft (means for 
bribery and auto theft were 1.29 and 1.54, respectively for 
the lawyer; means for bribery and auto theft were 1.30 and 
1.08 for the politician), there was a greater agreement when 
the no occupation defendant was charged with bribery (M =
1.75) than auto theft (M = 1.04). In addition, there was a 
marginal interaction between sex and occupation, F (1, 131)
= 2.80, jp < .07. Females tended to agree with the statement
more if the defendant was a lawyer or a politician (means 
were 1.76 and 1.29, respectively) than males (means were 
1.04 and 1.09, respectively). There was little difference, 
however, in agreement between females and males when the 
defendant was not assigned an occupation (means were 1.32 
and 1.48, respectively). Despite the differences between 
conditions, it must be noted that these scale values are all
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quite low, reflecting strong disagreement. In fact, 81% of 
all subjects responded with a 1, respresenting extreme 
disagreement, and 93% of the subjects responded with a 1 or 
a 2 .
Characteristics of the Defendants and Attorneys. 
Although it was not possible to examine all of the 
extraneous factors specific to each case, one of the most 
prominent features that might unintentionally confound the 
cases was the general appearance of the defendant. Subjects 
rated the defendant on four nine-point dimensions. Data 
were first analyzed by a 2 (subject sex) by 4 (case) by 3 
(defendant occupation) analysis of variance. Because no 
main effects or interactions were found involving subject 
sex, this factor was eliminated from the analysis.
Therefore, the data reported will be the results of a 4 
(case) by 3 (defendant occupation) analysis of variance.
Because similarly patterned main effects for case and 
interactions involving case and occupation occurred on each 
of the characteristics, a repeated measures analysis was 
conducted across the four dimensions. Although a main 
effect was found for the repeated measure, F (3, 462) =
3.04, p < .05, an analysis of variance revealed no
differences between honesty (M = 6.23) and trustworthiness 
(M = 6.13) and no differences between the higher ratings of 
sincerity (M = 6.35) and goodness (M = 6.40). The mean 
scores for each of the four defendant characteristics for 
each case and each occupation are shown in Table 10.
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Insert Table 10 about here
An overall main effect for case occurred across the 
four dimensions, I? (3 , 142) = 7 .06 , _p < .001. Defendants in 
both bribery cases were perceived to be more honest, 
sincere, trustworthy, and good (means were 6.60 and 6.88 for 
the $400 bribe and the $5000 bribe, respectively) than the 
defendant charged with the theft of a Buick (M = 5.48). The 
ratings of the defendant charged with the theft of a Ferrari 
did not significantly differ from these (M = 6.14). This 
was also qualified by an overall interaction between trial 
and occupation, IF (6 , 142) = 3.84, p < .001. Those
defendants who held occupations, particularly that of 
politician, were perceived to possess the most of these 
characteristics in the cases involving the $5000 bribe and 
the Buick theft. Occupation made little difference in the 
$400 bribery case and the no occupation defendant possessed 
the most of the characteristics in the Ferrari theft case.
In addition there was also a significant trial by repeated 
measures interaction, I? (9 , 462) = 2 .24, p < .05, and a 
trial by occupation by repeated measures interaction, F (18, 
462) = 1.73, p < .05. These were largely due to the overall
higher ratings of the defendants' sincerity and goodness, 
compared to honesty and trustworthiness.
Subjects' patterns of responses to the characteristics 
of each defendant were consistent for each character
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dimension. These differences between defendants contrast 
with the differences found between cases on the dependent 
variables. Thus, it must be emphasized that the ratings of 
the defendant characteristics are responses to the person 
who portrayed the defendant, rather than to factors built 
into the c a s e .
Although measures were taken at the beginning of the 
study to insure that all of the attorneys were of equal 
ability, it was possible that subjects" perceptions of the 
attorneys would differ. Therefore, subjects were asked to 
rate the overall quality of each attorney on a scale ranging 
from 0 to 10, the latter representing the highest quality. 
Because this assessment was not made in 3 of the 12 trials, 
caution must be exercised in interpreting these data. In a 
separate examination of each kind of attorney, no trial 
effect was found for the prosecuting attorney, but a main 
effect for case was found for the defense attorney, 1? (3, 
104) = 6 .37, j> < .001. Similar to the previous defendant 
assessments, a post-hoc comparison test revealed that the 
defense attorney was rated better in the $400 bribery case 
(M = 6.76) and the $5000 bribery' case (M = 7.41) than in the 
Ferrari theft case (M = 5.00). The attorney for the 
defendant charged with the theft of a Buick did not 
significantly differ from these (M = 6.07). In addition, a 
repeated measures analysis performed across the two 
attorneys revealed a main effect for the repeated measure, F 
(1, 104) = 28.49, p < .001. The defense attorneys were all
6 0
rated better (M = 6.66) than the prosecuting attorneys (M = 
4.86). This effect may be little more than a desire to keep 
ratings of the attorneys consistent with the verdicts, 
because the participating legal expert rated the prosecutors 
(in general) as more technically capable. Again, because 
the differences between the attorneys were not evident in 
any of the patterns in the results, it appeared that 
subjects were responding to the their perceptions of the 
persons portraying the attorneys, rather than the conceptual 
variables manipulated in the research.
Because of the consistent differences found between the 
trials for the characteristics of the defendant, an analysis 
of covariance was performed on the dependent measures of the 
presumption of innocence, using the combined
characterization of the defendant (honesty + trustworthiness 
+ sincerity + goodness) as the covariate. It was considered 
that differences between the appearances of the defendants 
might account for the lack of congruence effects. The 
analysis of covariance, however, failed to reveal additional 
congruence effects on the dependent measures. Although 
there was a single marginal interaction between sex and 
congruence on the second assessment of the defendant's guilt 
that was not detected in the analysis of variance, this 
occurred before subjects had actually seen the defendant. 
When the initial probabilities of guilt for the third 
assessment were correlated with the characterization of the 
defendant, a significant negative correlation was found, r
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(141) = -.44, £ < .001, such that the greater the 
probability of guilt, the less honest, sincere, trustworthy, 
and good the defendant appeared. When this character index 
was correlated with the fourth measure of the defendant's 
guilt, taken after deliberation, the significant correlation 
disappeared.
Discussion
Conclusions drawn from the above results must address 
three central issues, the lack of congruence effects and 
convergence in assessments of guilt across conditions as the 
trial progressed, whether or not subjects were able to 
presume innocence, and the consistent sex differences that 
occurred on the dependent variables. In addition, the 
attributions for criminal behavior may provide a fuller 
understanding of the results.
Although there was strong evidence suggesting that the 
dimension of congruence was perceived by subjects as 
intended, the congruence of the crime to the occupation of 
the defendant did not seem to alter subjects' presumptions 
of innocence at any stage during the trial. The 
manipulation of magnitude of the offense, while perceived, 
did not even affect subjects' ratings of the seriousness of 
the crime.
The absence of effects due to congruence at the start 
of the trial, and the relatively low scale value for the 
initial probability of guilt is in sharp contrast to 
previous research with exactly the same conceptual
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manipulations (Helgeson & Shaver, 1983). Whether this 
apparent lack of initial bias is due to the ability of 
subjects to withhold judgment when they knew they were going 
to be provided with more information and/or due to the more 
realistic characteristics of the courtroom setting cannot be 
determined from the present study. Indeed, both of these 
factors may operate in true juries. One possible 
explanation for the lack of congruence effects at this 
initial assessment that cannot be overlooked is that the 
crime and the occupation might not have yet been noticed by 
jurors. Because the manipulation check occurred at the end 
of the trial, the possibility that subjects did not notice 
the defendant's occupation in the judge's initial 
description of the charge at the start of the trial cannot 
be ruled o u t .
No congruence effects appeared on the few dependent 
variables included at the second or the third times of 
measurement. In fact, the number of predicted not guilty 
verdicts dramatically increased after the prosecution's 
presentation of the evidence (Time 2). This most obviously 
is an indication of the weakness in the prosecution's case 
for all of the defendants. By contrast, the probability of 
guilt for the defendant not only increased, but peaked at 
this point. This is consistent with Kaplan and Miller's 
(1978) finding that guilt should be highest after the 
prosecution's case has been made. But why did the 
probability of guilt increase and the number of predicted
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guilty verdicts decrease? The high correlation between 
probability of guilt and the guilty verdict at this second 
time of measurement suggests that subjects' responses to the 
question asked at the start of the trial might not have 
reflected their true beliefs. By the second time of 
measurment (half of the way through the trial), the salience 
and the impact of the judicial admonishion to presume 
innocence might have subsided enough for subjects to give 
their own response instead of their perceptions of the 
correct response. The large number of not guilty verdicts 
after the prosecution's presentation of evidence suggests 
that subjects might have already decided that the evidence 
was not sufficient for a conviction, and the subsequent 
testimony of the defendant only confirmed his innocence.
Subjects gave the highest confidence ratings to their 
estimates of the defendant's guilt at the third time of 
measurement, which was at the end of the trial, but before 
deliberation. In addition, the correlation between estimate 
of guilt and predicted verdict was highest at this time of 
assessment. But, the presumption of innocence measures 
taken after jury deliberation again did not reflect any 
differences due to the congruence dimension. And here it is 
certain that the dimension had been perceived. At the end 
of the trial, there were no effects for any of the variables 
introduced in the research.
Regardless of the apparent absence of response to the 
biasing factor, the important question to be answered is
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whether or not subjects then presumed innocence across 
conditions. First, the distribution of the initial 
probability of guilt estimates and their correspondence to 
subsequent verdicts must be considered. In spite of the 
explicit presumption of innocence warning, 29% of the 
subjects said there was an equal likelihood of guilt or 
innocence at the start of the trial. If this many subjects 
could misunderstand the presumption of innocence so easily, 
one might wonder how many more subjects privately 
disregarded the presumption of innocence, but were not able 
to make their disregard public. The relatively large 
standard deviations for the initial probability of guilt 
(see Table 3) indicate the lack of consistency in subjects' 
responses within conditions. Not only would the 
psychological constraints of the experiment inhibit the 
admission of biases, but the judicial instruction would 
provide the "correct" answer for the defendant's initial 
probability of guilt —  0. The validity of the responses of 
the 39% of subjects who said that they presumed innocence 
becomes even more questionable when it is observed that one- 
fourth of the subjects who said the probability of guilt for 
the defendant at the start of the trial was 0 also said that 
they would vote guilty. The correlation between subjects' 
estimates of the defendant's guilt and their expected 
verdicts was significant, but not impressive. In fact, this 
correlation was much higher at both the second and third 
times of measurement. Furthermore, subjects' confidence in
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their first predicted verdict was fairly low. Although 
congruence effects were not detected on the other less 
obvious dependent measures of the presumption of innocence, 
the mean scores across conditions were much higher than 
those for the initial probability of guilt. The probability 
of guilt if suspicious evidence were introduced ranged from 
5.33 to 7.58, and if the defendant failed to testify from 
5.27 to 7.69, both rated on 10-point scales where 0
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reflected a presumption of innocence and 10 reflected a 
presumption of guilt. The amount of evidence required from 
the defendant to prove innocence varied around the middle of 
the nine-point scale, ranging from 3.85 to 6.61. Certainly 
in absolute terms, these values did not reflect a 
presumption of innocence.
The inconsistency in subjects" responses within the 
initial presumption of innocence measures and verdicts 
during the first two times of measurement might be explained 
in part by a misunderstanding of the task they were to 
perform and confusion about the meaning of the presumption 
of innocence. It may be that subjects were indicating their 
expectancies about the likelihood of the defendant's 
innocence or guilt, rather than their actual presumptions of 
innocence. It is questionable, however, whether one who 
ejcpects to convict a defendant or believes that evidence of 
guilt will be brought forth can presume innocence.
In addition, at the beginning of the trial subjects 
claimed they could be extremely impartial despite the crime
66
or occupation of the defendant, as reflected by the 
consistently high mean scores and small standard deviations 
across conditions. Subjects, however, did believe a 
moderate number of others would be biased. Although 
subjects' estimates of their own impartiality remained 
consistently high from the start to the end of the trial, 
perceptions of others at the end of the trial indicated that 
fewer people would be biased than originally thought at the 
start of the trial.
Congruence effects were noticeable in one area of the 
research —  the attributions for the defendant's behavior. 
The attribution to a character flaw for the defendant 
charged with the congruent crime was greater than the 
attribution for the defendant charged with the incongruent 
crime both at the start and at the end of the trial. In 
addition, the attribution to atypical behavior was greater 
for the defendant charged with the incongruent crime than 
the congruent crime during both times of measurement. While 
these effects were extracted through planned comparisons, it 
must be noted that even on the attribution measures the 
expected interaction between crime and occupation did not 
occur. A negative relationship, however, was found between 
the attribution to character flaw and atypical behavior at 
the end of the trial.
Several important differences occurred in the 
comparison of judgments made after deliberation to those 
made at the start of the trial. The criterion of proof
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beyond a reasonable doubt was raised, the probability of the 
defendant's guilt if suspicious evidence were introduced 
decreased , and the burden of proof on the defendant was 
lowered. Thus, at the end of the trial subjects were more 
able to make judgments in accordance with the law by 
presuming innocence than they were at the start of the 
trial. These changes may have occurred in response to the 
not guilty verdicts returned in all 12 trials, as subjects 
brought their perceptions more in line with their actions. 
The seriousness of the task might have led subjects to 
adhere more strictly to the evidence and to disregard their 
own personal feelings. An alternative explanation for all 
of these repeated measure effects is that the impact of bias 
decreased as evidence increased, a suggestion made by Kaplan 
and Miller (1978). The specific effect of jury deliberation 
cannot be determined in this study, although the two pre­
post deliberation measures show a decrease in the 
defendant's probability of guilt after the not guilty 
verdict had been returned and a decrease in the confidence 
of this estimate of guilt after deliberation. This quite 
easily could be attributed to the fact that two of the 
juries did not reach a unanimous decision, and also that 
public compliance with the verdict need not be accompanied 
by private acceptance.
It is interesting to speculate why the attribution to 
circumstances decreased at the end of the trial when the 
trial scenario was expected to emphasize the circumstances
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of the crime. Because the scope of these cases was limited 
to a single offense and the trial consisted mainly of the 
testimony of a prosecution witness and the defendant, 
subjects might have gained more knowledge about the 
defendant's character and behavior than ordinarily obtained 
in a more complex case where a number of witnesses and a 
variety of evidence are introduced. In addition bribery 
might be a crime that is more indicative of an offender's 
character, because the atribution to character flaw for all 
three occupation conditions was greater for bribery than 
auto theft at the end of the trial. There were also changes 
in the attributions made to atypical behavior between the 
two measurements. Subjects attributed less to the lawyer 
and politician acting in a manner different from normal 
behavior after the trial than they had suggested at the 
start of the trial.
The one unanticipated effect, but the most consistent, 
was the difference in judgments made by males and females. 
From the start, females were more surprised than males that 
any defendant was charged with a crime. But once charged, 
females believed any defendant was more guilty of either 
crime. In fact, across all four times of measurement 
females rated the defendant as more likely to be guilty than 
males. Similar sex differences occurred on other dependent 
measures of the presumption of innocence. Both at the start 
and at the end of the trial females rated the defendant more 
guilty if suspicious evidence were introduced and if the
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defendant failed to testify. By contrast, across all four 
times of measurement males were more confident of their 
lower estimates of initial guilt and more confident of their 
verdicts. Males also claimed greater impartiality at the 
start of the trial. Previous research has offered at least 
partial support for the conviction-proneness of females 
(Mills & Bohannon, 1980), but much of the jury research has 
produced inconsistent findings for sex differences in 
judgments of a defendant's guilt. These judgments are 
typically given in the form of verdicts, rather than 
presumptions of innocence, without consideration given to 
subjects' confidence in their judgments. In one collection 
of survey data on the general population's impartiality 
towards defendants (Cons tantini, Mallery, & Yapundich,
1983), consistent sex differences arose indicating that 
females were more likely to prejudge guilt regardless of the 
crime.
While the results of the present research offer further 
support for this finding, it must be noted that the four 
defendants in both studies were male. There is evidence 
that jurors are mo re likely to acquit s ame sex defendants 
(Mills & Bohannon, 1980), but there is also evidence that 
females are more harsh on female defendants than male 
defendants (Bloomstein, 1968, cited in Mills & Bohannon, 
1980). What the present study adds to this picture is the 
finding that females are not as confident in their judgments 
and may be more willing to change their minds. In fact, the
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meta-analysis performed on social influence studies by Eagly 
and Carli (1981) concluded that the finding that females 
were more influenceable than males was reliable. The effect 
size, however, was determined to be quite small. It may be 
that females are simply more willing to admit their biases 
and their low confidence in judgments than males. So, while 
females may have prejudged guilt, they may have been more 
capable of holding off the final judgment.
Several interactions between subject sex and the 
occupation of the defendant indicate that males and females' 
perceptions of the specific occupations and crimes used in 
this study and perhaps the dimension of congruence sharply 
differ. During the first time of assessment females rated 
the politician as the least guilty at the start of the trial 
and felt that he needed to prove the least amount of 
evidence compared to the other two defendants, while males 
gave their highest ratings of initial guilt to the 
politician and required him to prove the most evidence. The 
occupation of the defendant affected males and females 
feelings of impartiality differently after deliberation. 
Although males again required the most evidence from the 
politician, after the trial, they believed themselves to be 
the most impartial when judging a politician. At the end of 
the trial females agreed with males in requiring the 
politician to produce the most evidence, but in contrast to 
males, they believed themselves to be the most impartial 
when judging a defendant who had not been assigned an
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occupation.
A possible explanation for the above finding is that 
one believes one is more capable of making a fair judgment 
when one is in fact confronted with biased information.
This contention is further supported by the fact subjects 
believed it was more important to reveal a defendant's 
occupation when he had been charged with bribery than auto 
theft. This was a difference between the two crimes, 
however, rather than congruence. Subjects may gain a sense 
of certainty from the knowledge contained in biased 
information or feel a greater need to claim impartiality 
when confronted with biased information. This proposition 
has serious implications for the effectiveness of voir dire 
as a procedure employed to obtain a set of fair and 
impartial jurors. If jurors who are in fact biased insist 
that they are impartial, the time and effort expended in 
asking potential jurors whether or not they can give the 
defendant an impartial hearing is wasted. Females, however, 
seem able to assess more accurately their own bias at the 
end of the trial, evidenced by the fact they believed 
themselves to be more impartial toward the no occupation 
defendant than the politician, and admitted that they 
required more evidence from the latter compared to the 
former.
As a final attempt to extract congruence effects, 
defendant characteristics had been included as dependent 
variables with the consideration that they might mediate the
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effects of the independent variables. Consistent effects, 
in fact, appeared across the characteristics between the 
cases suggesting that there were differences among the 
appearances of the defendants. When the analysis was 
performed, controlling for the extraneous variable in an 
analysis of covariance, congruence effects still did not 
emerge. Thus, although perceptions of the defendants 
differed, they did not distort judgments of guilt such that 
congruence effects were masked.
In conclusion, the internal contradictions for the 
estimates of guilt at the first time of measurement make it 
impossible to interpret the low probability of initial guilt 
as a presumption of innocence. More likely, subjects 
responded by giving both socially desirable answers and 
lawfully correct answers. These results particular to the 
initial assessment, however, are not nearly as important as 
the consideration of the trial as a whole. While some 
combination of crime and/or occupation may or may not have 
initially biased subjects, by the end of the trial after 
having heard all of the evidence it becomes more certain 
that subjects were not biased by any interaction between the 
crime and the occupation of the defendant.
Although a formal analysis of the taped jury 
deliberations was not performed, a summary of material 
common to most of the deliberations aids understanding of 
the results. First, jurors brought out the fact that the 
burden of proof was on the prosecution to prove the
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defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and also that 
the defendant simply did not have to prove his innocence. 
Second, when the personal feelings of jurors were expressed, 
other jurors admonished them to adhere to the evidence 
produced in the trial. Third, the consensus in all of the 
trials was that there was not enough evidence to convict the 
defendant. In an effort to understand the facts of the case 
subjects often called upon personal experience. Detailed 
debates over the facts and the testimony not only suggest 
that the subjects paid close attention to the trials, but 
also that they took their task quite seriously. In only a 
few of the trial deliberations were the occupations of the 
defendants mentioned, and these occurred in reference to 
(rather than description of) the defendant. In almost all 
of the trials uncertainties were expressed about the 
truthfulness of the defendant's testimony, but the final 
decision rested on the basis of whether the prosecution 
proved (beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant was 
guilty. Although the number of males and females supporting 
each verdict could not be discerned from the recordings, in 
one deliberation it was quite clear that initially all of 
the females favored a guilty verdict, while the males 
supported a not guilty verdict. This also supports the 
finding of females' greater susceptibility to influence over 
males, an effect found to be the greatest in the group 
pressure conformity studies (Eagly & Carli , 1981).
These results have important implications for social
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psychological jury r e s e a r c h  that p r o v i d e s  subjects with 
brief written descriptions of defendants and/or cases, fails 
to employ judicial instructions, and does not make any 
provision for jury deliberation or a realistic courtroom 
setting. Generalizations from this kind of research to true 
jury trials would be tenuous at best. It is certainly a 
critical point made by Konecni and Ebbesen (1982) that such 
research is of minimal value for understanding the operation 
of true juries. While the variables manipulated in much of 
the research have been shown to influence mock juror 
judgments, often the variables of interest are 
overemphasized by virtue of the differences in the levels, 
the magnitude of the manipulation, and the small amount of 
contextual information provided. Certainly one would be 
more lenient in judging an attractive or a similar defendant 
than an unattractive or dissimilar defendant if that were 
the only information provided. But exactly how important 
will attractivenss or similarity be when jurors are 
confronted with judicial instructions, testimony from 
witnesses, arguments by attorneys, and an opportunity to 
deliberate along with a group of peers? The results from 
this research suggest that, regardless of whether or not 
subjects presume innocence (and they probably do not), a 
group of jurors may be able to overcome the impact of 
biasing factors and make a more fair and impartial 
evaluation of the evidence than previous research has 
concluded —  with the provision they are instructed both at
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the start and at the end of the trial to presume the 
defendant innocent.
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Table 1
Manipulation Check on Congruence
Occup: Occupation No Occupation
Crime: Bribery Theft Bribery Theft
Sex: F M F M F M F M
M 4.46 3.35 6.51 5.00 6.08 5.33 4.62 3.55
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Table 2
Proportions of Persons that Commit Bribery and Auto Theft
Occup: Lawyer 
Crime: Bribery Theft 
Sex: F M F M
Politician 
Bribery Thef t 
F M F M
Proportion of All People
M 65.83 68.58 77.85 62.20 69.09 62.75 79.17 74.17
Proportion of Lawyers and Politicians
M 67.50 64.25 59.85 37 .30 29.09 72.75 62.08 56 . 50
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Table 3
Estimates of Initial Probabili t y of Guilt
Across Four Times of Measurement
Occup: Lawye r Politician None
Sex: F M F M F M
Time 1
M 4.12 1 .57 3.21 3.29 4.48 2 . 48
SD (2.71) (2.29) (2.88) (2.93) (3.08) (2.64)
Time 2
M 4.48 3 .96 4.04 4 . 04 4.24 3 . 96
SD (1.85) (2.30) (1.55) (2.38) (2.52) (2.88)
Time 3
M 3.44 3 .74 3.04 1.96 4 . 00 3.39
SD (2.89) (3.22) (2 .64) (1 .80) (3.63) (3.14)
Time 4
M 4 . 08 2.59 3.71 3.67 4 .48 2.48
SD (2.73) (2.60) (2.64) (2.82) (3.40) (2.70)
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Table 4
Confidence in Initial Probabilities of Guilt
Aero s s the Four Times of Measurement
Sex : Female Mai e
Time 1 M 4.86 6.50
Time 2 M 5.73 6.76
Time 3 M 7 . 28 7.37
Time 4 M 6 . 01 7 .00
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Table 5
Pre- and Post-Measures of the Presumption of Innocence
Occup : Lawyer Politician None
Sex I F M F M F M
Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
Time 1 M 7 . 00 6 . 82 6.88 7 .04 7 . 28 7 . 00
Time 4 M 8.16 7 . 68 8.08 7 . 83 7 .92 7. 96
Suspicious Evidence Introduced
Time 1 M 6 .83 5 .24 7 . 13 7 . 00 6 .75 5 . 86
Time 4 M 6.80 5 .09 6.46 6.46 6.74 5 .28
Amount Evidence to Prove Innocence
Time 1 M 6 . 44 5 .24 4. 92 6.08 6 . 08 4 .74
Time 4 M 4 . 04 2.83 4 .58 5 . 08 4.76 3 . 43
Guilt if De f end en t Fails to Testify
Time 1 M 7.08 5.39 7.39 5.67 5 . 92 4 . 78
Time 4 M 6 .36 5 .65 6 . 58 6 .13 6 .52 4 . 65
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Table 6
Confidence in Individual Verdict s 
Across the Three Times of Measurement
Sex: Female Ma 1 e
Time 1 M 3.66 3 .94
Time 2 M 5 .56 6.43
Time 3 M 7.43 7. 69
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Table 7
Pre- and Post-Measures of Own Impartiality 
and Perceived Bias in Others
Occup: Lawye r Politician None
Sex : F M F M F M
Imp art i ali ty
Time 1 M 7 . 80 8 .35 7.83 8.63 8 . 40 8 . 35
Time 4 M 8. 08 8 .43 8.25 8.61 8.72 8 . 04
Perceived Bias
Time 1 M 5 .72 4 .65 5.42 5.67 4 . 64 4.74
Time 4 M 5.12 4.26 4.96 4.91 4 .20 4 . 91
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Table 8
Pre- and Post-Attribution Characteristics
Occup: Lawyer 
Crime: Bribe Theft
Politician 
Bribe Theft
None
Bribe Theft
Character Flaw
Time 1 M 5.04 3 .59 5.58 4 -96 4.35 3 .91
Time 4 M 4.83 4 . 00 4.87 4 -04 4 .46 3 .26
Circumstance
Time 1 M 7.00 6 . 00 6.13 6.30 6 .04 5 .61
Time 4 M 5.25 4.96 5.26 5.54 4.92 5 .70
Atypical Behavior
Time 1 M 6 .22 6.68 5.54 7.30 4.26 4.30
Time 4 M 5 - 29 6.33 5 .57 6 .21 5 . 04 5 .57
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Table 9
Mean Scores for Ancillary Dependent Measures
Occup: Lawyer Poli tic ian None
Crime: Bribe Theft Bribe Theft Bribe Theft
Importance of Occupation
M 5.25 5.88 6.65 5.13 6.42 4.58
Better to Set 10 Free —  Agree/Disagree 
M 1.29 1.54 1.30 1.08 1.75 1.04
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Table 10
Characteristics of the Defendant
Trial: Bribe —  $ 5000 Bribe —  $4 00 Ferrari Bui ck
Ho ne s t y
Lawyer M 7.25 6 . 50 6.14 4 . 55
P o 1' i t i c M 7.57 6. 87 5.33 6. 13
No ne M 5 . 86 6.53 6 .85 5.00
Trustworthiness
Lawye r M 7 . 33 6.43 5.79 5 ,18
Politic M 7 . 43 7 . 07 5 . 07 5 . 67
No ne M 6 . 00 6.47 7 .00 4.21
Sincerity
Lawye r M 7.42 5.79 6 .07 6 . 00
Politic M 7.64 7.13 5.4 7 6 . 67
No ne M 5.86 6.60 7.23 4.43
Trustworthiness
Lawye r M 7 .17 5 .79 6 .21 5 .64
Politic M 7 . 14 7 .40 5 . 93 6 .73
None M 6 .14 6.47 7 . 00 5.14
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Appendix A
General Instructions for the Presumption of Innocence
"The defendant is presumed to be innocent. You should 
not assume the defendant is guilty because he has been 
indicted and is on trial. This presumption of innocence 
remains with the defendant throughout the trial and is 
enough to require you to find the defendant not guilty 
unless and until the Commonwealth proves each and every 
element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This does 
not require proof beyond all possible doubt, but only beyond 
a reasonable doubt; nor is the Commonwealth required to 
disprove every conceivable circumstance of innocence. A 
reasonable doubt is a doubt based on your sound judgment 
after a full and impartial consideration of all of the 
evidence in the case. However, suspicion or probability of 
guilt is not enough for a conviction. There is no burden on 
the defendant to produce any evidence."
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Appendix B
Dependent Measures on the Presumption of Innocence
1. After being indicted and initially brought to trial, what 
is the probability that at the beginning of the trial 
this defendant is guilty as charged?
(0%) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (100%)
2. How much evidence do you believe the prosecution would 
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
convict this defendant?
(none) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (extremely
much )
3. If evidence were introduced against this defendant that 
raised strong suspicions about the defendant, what would 
you believe would be the probability that he is guilty?
(0%) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (100%)
4. How much evidence do you believe this defendant would
have to offer in his defense in order to prove innocence?
(none) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (extremely
much )
5. If this defendant refuses to testify in his behalf, what 
would you believe is the probability that he is guilty?
(0%) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 (100%)
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